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HOW TO DEFINE THE LIMITS OF
RESPONSIBILITY
by CARLETON H. GRIFFIN

We are living in a particularly difficult business environment. A combination of economic recession and severe
inflation has brought widespread business failures and
investor losses. But also significant is what has been
exposed in their wake: a disturbing amount of improper
conduct in the corporate world.
It is perhaps not surprising to hear of misdeeds in such
circumstances, or even the sheer volume and size of what
has been discovered. Recent economic troubles have been
pervasive and serious. But what is more noteworthy is the
amount of collusive misconduct unearthed at high corporate levels. The greatest mischief, moreover, has not been
mundane defalcations—where the perpetrator's benefits
are direct. It has been the highly sophisticated manipulation of accounting records and procedures to produce
indirect benefits, through influencing stock prices or job
status. Thus, we learn of not only the age-old problems of
altered inventory records and fictitious vendors, but also
such cooperative sleight-of-hand as hidden loan guarantees and contributed capital masquerading as sales
revenue.
Backwash from the Watergate era has added another
dimension—the revelation of substantial corporate
political gifts which were "laundered" through fictitious
expense classifications and disguised expenditures of
currency. In many instances, these practices have apparently been carried on for some time and are just now
coming to light.
The latest development—which followed the dramatic
death leap by the chief executive of one of the nation's
largest companies—is the burgeoning series of disclosures
concerning payments made by multinational concerns in
order to secure foreign business. These practices—whether
bribes, kickbacks, or commissions—are at odds in varying
degrees with US and foreign laws, as well as with business
ethics. They are accomplished in much the same way as
political gifts, though usually in a more complicated
fashion. Their discovery has caused not only corporate
embarrassment and the resignation or dismissal of some
top executives—but also the closing down of operations in
foreign lands. It has even triggered international crises.
General economic ills and Watergate cannot explain all

of these developments, although they have been substantial factors. So too has the new tide of consumerism, which
has focused attention on old misdeeds and made them new
problems. And as fuzzy policies and their unenthusiastic
administration have created a permissive atmosphere in
business, competitive pressures have made it easy to
rationalize that "it can't be really wrong if everyone else is
doing it." Add computerized accounting to the size and
complexity of many businesses, and you aggravate the
problem—providing increasingly inviting opportunities for
inventive minds to cloud the real nature of transactions.
These developments are causing difficulties for a great
many people. Investors have been damaged or feel threatened. Regulatory officers are asserting their official
concern. And there is a group in the middle—corporate
board members and officers, together with independent
auditors—who are being asked with increasing frequency
such questions as: "Where were you when . . .?" "Why
didn't you . . .?" "Who is going to cover my losses?"
Auditors Challenged First
To date, auditors have been the most beleaguered targets
of such challenges. Their principal antagonists appear to be
lawyers who make careers out of representing large groups
of faceless investors in class action lawsuits. In the name of
consumerism, these lawyers wield the threat of spectacularly large claims, unhindered by any realistic responsibility for the defendant's costs of protecting himself. The
technical auditing and accounting issues involved, and the
unpredictability of judge or jury in the event of carrying the
case to trial, can make the threat of a staggering loss very
real to the auditor-defendant, creating in turn great pressure for an out-of-court compromise. And, unfortunately,
the auditor's problem is compounded with distaste when
he senses that the plaintiff's counsel is less interested in
winning a court verdict for the claimed damages than in a
settlement whose acceptability is measured by the size of a
contingent legal fee.
The courts are also adding to the legal difficulties of the
auditor. For example, decisions in recent years indicate that
a plaintiff suing an accountant under the federal securities
laws probably needs to prove only that the financial state3
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ments in question were misleading and negligently
audited. That is, in contrast with the ordinary requirements
of proving a negligence case, it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to establish his reliance on such statements.
In another step, the courts have greatly expanded the
breadth of people to whom CPAs are responsible for
deficient actions. It now appears that in many states
(and until recently under the federal securities laws),
the auditor can be held liable to a large group of
unknown third persons for mere negligence. This contrasts with the longstanding Ultramares rule that the
accountant owed a duty to such parties only in case
of reckless and wanton misconduct.
To the extent these developments go, the courts
have concluded that CPAs occupy a role akin to that
of a guarantor of the financial statements with which
they are associated. That is indeed a staggering
burden to carry.
The SEC is another source of concern to auditors. Apparently it is uneasy about its ability to carry out its own
policing role when mischief so abounds. Clearly it is
attempting to use the independent accounting firms as its
enforcement arm as much as possible. This is apparent in its
strong assertions about the high duty of auditors to uncover embezzlements and financial misrepresentations
during the ordinary course of an audit. In addition, the
commission is attempting to make independent accounting firms public whistle blowers for matters far beyond
their responsibility concerning financial statements.
The most striking example of this pertains to illegal foreign payments. The SEC apparently expects the auditor 1) to
disclose all illegality, irrespective of the magnitude of the
transaction involved and its impact on the client's statements, and 2) to disclose material transactions that are only
suspected to be illegal. This responsibility would be particularly onerous for the auditor, since not even the SEC has
developed any measurable standards defining the kinds of
acts which it believes should be subject to disclosure.
Although the focus of all of these challenges—by
lawyers, the courts, and the SEC—has been largely concentrated on the independent auditor, the field is rapidly
widening. Parallel responsibility is being pressed on corporate directors and officers. They are being named as defendants with increasing frequency by investors who have
found in them an additional source of recoverable funds.
Similarly, the SEC has recently charged several directors
of one large company with failure to supervise adequately
the management of that ill-fated enterprise. In another
case, the commission has criticized outside directors for
their failure to become informed about and exercise
control over the accounting principles applied by a com4

pany whose financial statements were deemed to be false
and misleading. The commission has also begun, through
its enforcement powers, to require some directors to be replaced by persons who are responsible for mandated
change in corporate policy. In doing so, it demonstrates its
view of the duty a corporate board has to a broadly defined
public.
It would be fruitless and, to a large extent irresponsible,
for auditors, directors, and corporate officers to attempt to
hold their lines of responsibility to the narrower bounds of
yesterday. Investors, the courts, and the general public are
asserting themselves to the contrary—and must be heard.
The Limits of Responsibility
A realistic line must be drawn, however, in setting these
new responsibilities. What is outside this line, and is beyond the limit of acceptability, is the following:
Auditors as guarantors. Outside auditors can be viewed
neither as quasi-guarantors of their client's financial
statements nor as indemnifiers of investor losses. The enforcement of such a rule would soon eliminate the profession, No sensible person would remain in or enter public
accounting if such risks were virtually limitless. Indeed, to
defend itself against unmerited litigation, the profession
needs to come up with a sensible way of minimizing the
legal risk which an auditor can face. O n e method might be
the statutory limitation on liability now being studied as a
proposed amendment to the federal securities laws.
Exposure of Illegal Corporate Acts. Auditors and corporate directors cannot be expected to reveal to the
investing world, or to its regulators, all illegal or otherwise
questionable corporate acts regard/ess of the effect of such
acts on a company's financial statements. Responsibility
must be realistically confined to matters having a significant impact on a company's financial affairs.
O n the other hand, acceptable limits of responsibility
include:
Standards for corporate conduct. Directors and officers
should be responsible for defining, with reasonable clarity,
corporate standards of conduct for such transactions as political contributions and foreign payments. They should
also take reasonable steps to enforce adherence to those
standards. Their auditors, in turn, should be responsible for
reviewing such standards and measuring compliance in the
course of their professional work.
Corporate duty to uncover fraud. Directors and officers
should recognize that the prime duty to thwart and
uncover fraudulent activity within the corporation rests
upon themselves, not on their auditors. This calls for a
strong commitment to sound internal controls and effec-

tive internal auditing, both of which are subject to review
and evaluation by the outside accountant.
Auditing for illegal transactions. Auditors must recognize their duty to take reasonable steps to uncover illegal or
unauthorized transactions whenever doing so will have a
material effect on the audited financial statements. Certain
transactions—for example, collusive defalcations, or misrepresentations by management—may be impossible to
detect, but the auditor cannot resign himself to non-discovery because of the lack of an assured result.
What Must an Auditor Do?
Concerning his responsibility to discover illegal or unauthorized transactions, what expanded procedure should
an auditor follow? Given a particular client, and circumstance of time and place, he should first focus on likely
areas of exposure, then design appropriate examination
steps, and finally apply his professional skills thoroughly to
the facts. Of course, detection of some wrongdoing may
escape the best investigation possible.
For example, in the wake of Watergate a great deal of
attention has been focused by the press and the government on domestic and foreign corporate influence payments. Under the circumstances, audit procedures which
have not been customary in the past should be performed if
additional conditions exist which raise a concern that corporate management may have committed an illegal act.
Such a presumption could arise, for example, if the corporation has been a party to the kind of transactions that
have received widespread public criticism in its particular
industry or in foreign areas where the client operates. The
transactions to be examined should be those that are material to the financial statements. Particular scrutiny, of
course, should be given in situations involving substantial
consequences to the company, such as when the continuation of a material earnings stream appears to depend
on the future conceal mentor repetition of the illegal acts in
question.
The essence of the auditor's conduct in such circumstances is to be alert to unusual internal and external factors
which indicate a high likelihood of illegal or unauthorized
transactions. Whether the concern be for illegal influence
payments, defalcations, or financial misrepresentations,
the auditor's approach and attitude should be fundamentally the same—that of making a thorough professional investigation.
No matter what form they may ultimately take, the burgeoning duties of the auditor are becoming substantial
indeed. Taking on those duties in a world poised to claim
malperformance only intensifies the seriousness of his re-

sponsibility. Clearly, to meet the challenge, a public accounting firm must give the closest possible attention to the
quality of its work.
A Logical Proposal
Quality requires not only recruiting able people and updating their training; it also requires continuous evaluation of the firm's policies and procedures, the correction of any deficiencies, and the adoption of improved
techniques. But while this has been carried on by many
firms for many years—with each firm reviewing its work
internally—the day has now come when it is apparent that
these internal audits must be supplemented by the engagement of qualified people from the outside. 1 am referring to "peer reviewers." The profession's new exposure to
liability makes this extra measure of objective quality
control imperative. The public will no longer accept the
strictly private self-discipline we have been practicing on
ourselves. Clearly, just as other professions have improved
the quality of their service in this way, so can auditors as
they strive to fulfill their obligations to the public.
What is actually being done within the profession today
in keeping with expanded audit responsibility and improved quality control procedures? Speaking for this firm,
our auditing effort has been augmented over the past two
years by a substantial set of guidelines which attempt to
ferret out fraudulent transactions, particularly where corporate management is involved in material transactions.
These guidelines are now being amplified to cover the
broader area of illegal corporate payments, reflecting that
newly arising set of problems. In addition, the principle of
peer review is embodied in a present commitment to
expose the firm's policies and procedures to a team of outside auditors. These actions are positive steps toward one
firm's faithful discharge of its duty to clients and to the
public.
Conclusion
The days are difficult. New duties are being thrust upon
many people. The independent auditor has been increasingly made aware of this reality for several years, and corporate directors and officers are becoming similarly
exposed. It is easy for all of us to react with indignation and
profess an inability to assume a higher duty. Some of the
newly defined responsibilities do seem clearly impossible
to assume, but others would satisfy reasonable public expectations which can and should be met. The essential
problems are to determine which of those new duties
should be assumed and then earnestly to pursue them.
Otherwise, we may find somebody else on the job.
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